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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.1011~ UAL.~ANJ~.

Plaintiff OJnd Ap·pellant,

Case
No.

vs.
DO~ALD H.
l\lOYI,~S, his

MOYES and BETTY
wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

10134

RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE~[ENT

OF KIND OF CASE

The respondents agree with the statement of the
appellant relating to this case, but point out that there is
one additional point of law raised by the respondents
regarding the commencement of a second action in the
district court following the dismissal of this action, the
dismissal of the second action, and the subsequent appeal
of this action.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was dismissed in the lower court as is
stated in the appellant's brief. It should be noted, howl'Yer, that inlllediately subsequent to such dismissal, the

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and L
1
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appellants filed a second action alleging the identical
claimed cause of action as is herein stated (R 20-22).
A motion to dismiss the subsequently filed action was
granted by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge, on
the grounds that the issues were res judicata by reason
of the dismissal of the first action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL·
The respondents seek a dismissal of the appellant's
appeal for the reason that the same was not timely made,
but was made only after the attempted refiling of the
same complaint had been dismissed.
STAT'EMENT OF FACTS
The respondents agree with the statement of facts
as set out in the brief of the appellant, but assert the
following to be additional facts which justify the dismissal of the appellant's appeal. Following the dismissal
of this action by the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., on
F·ebruary 21, 1964, (R 5), a subsequent action was filed
on February 28, alleging identical facts to those recited
in the camplaint which had been dismissed (R 20-22).
Apparently, the appellant sought this means to avoid
an appeal, as he alleges no new or additional facts in the
second complaint. To the second compaint, a motion to
dismiss was argued, and the sa1ne was granted by the
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson on the grounds that the
issues raised by the second cmnplaint were res judicata
by reason of the prior ruling of Judge VanCott (R 23-24).
Immediately following the dis1nissal of the second action,
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tlH· appt>llunt filPd his motion to Pxtend thP tinw for the
app(lal of the first, or this, action (R 6), supported by
tlw affidavit of his counsel, which recited that counsel
had not reePivPd a copy of the notice of the order of dismissal of this aetion (R 13-14). The Motion to Extend
t hP 'rinw for Filing the Notice of Appeal was granted
hy .Tudgt~ Anderson (R 8), from which ruling and granting of such <>xtension these respondents filed their cross
appeal.

STA'rEl\[ENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
Appellants Point on Appeal:
IN SEEKING CONTRIBUTION AND REIMBURSEMENT, A JUDGEMENT DEBTOR IS NOT LIMITED
TO RULE 69(h) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE. THE CONVENIENCE PROVIDED
FOR BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT IN SAID
RULE IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR MAY SEEK CONTRIBUTION
FROM HIS CODEFENDANTS WHO ARE LIABLE
FOR THEIR PORPORTION OF THE DEBT IN TWO
ALTERNATIVES. HE HAS THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ACT UNDER THE CONVENIENCE OUTLINED IN
THE AFORESAID RULE WITHIN ONE MONTH
AFTER PAYMENT, OR SECONDLY BY FILING A
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT ACTION WITHIN
FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PERSON TO BE REIMBURSED HAS PAID THE JUDGMENT.

Respondents Point on CToss Appeal:
THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL FOR THE
PLAINTIFF, IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO DETERMINE APPEAL TIME AND MOTION TO EX-
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TEND TIME FOR APPEAL, TOGETHER WITH HIS
TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING OF THE MOTION
TO EXTEND TIME FOR APPEAL DO NOT, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, ASSERT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS
UPON WHICH TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR APPEAL, AND THE TRIAL COURT, HONORABLE
ALDON J. ANDERSON, PRESIDING, ERRED IN
GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR APPEAL.

ARGUIYIENT

Appellant's Point on Appeal
The respondent cannot agree with the contention
of the appellant that the rule as stated in Rule 69 (h),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, should be construed as
comulative rather than exclusive. The language of the
rule seems plain when it states:
"The person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month after payment . . . . file in the court where the judgment
was rendered a notice of such payn1ent and his
claim for contributions or reimbursen1ent." (Italics added.)
The language is plain and unmnbiguous, and the
word "shall" appears to be used in a directory sense and
not a permissive one. The logic of requiring a notice to
be filed within thirty days under this rule would appear
to be sound, in that once the principal claim has been
adjudicated, subsequent claims growing out of the original claim as among defendants should be disposed of.
As the right to contribution demands as one prerequisite, payment of the principal obligation by the
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:->!•Pking eontribution, the interprt>tation called
for h!· th(• argun1ent of the appellant could lead to ext nmw protraction of the period during which such a
:->11it might hP instituh•d. If as in the present case, the
original agTPPment with the judgment creditor and giving
ri~w to tlw liability upon which contribution is sought
W<'l'<' in writing, the parties would be subject to suit
l'or 8ix years. After judgment was entered, an additional
Pight yt>ar:-; 1night elapse before the judgn1ent creditor
wa8 ahlP to pxtract payment from one of the judgment
rl<'htor:-;. To this period of fourteen years, the appellant
argus that an additional four years in which to seek his
eontribution should be added. By this argmnent, three
statutP8 of lilnitations could be appended consecutively,
the first being the statute upon the original agreement,
the s~·eond being the statute during which payment of a
judgnwnt could lw enforced by judgment creditor, and
a third whereby the judgtnent debtor could bring an
adion for contribution. It is submitted that the ruling
of Judge YanCott is proper, and that the remedy of a
judg1nent debtor seeking contribution from another judgment debtor is set out in Rule 69(h), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and that such re1nedy is exclusive.

pPrHon

Respondent's Point on Appeal

It will be noted from the record that, following the
di::'missal of this action by Judge VanCott, that the
appellants iimnediately refiled a new complaint, stating
the srune cause of action as that recited in the complaint
clismissed (R :20-:2:2). This complaint was dismissed by
Judge Aldon Anderson April6, 1964, (R 23), and a copy
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mailed to counsel for the appellant on the san1e date
(R 24). The next day, April 7, counsel returned to this,
the original action filed, and moved to extend the time
for appeal (R 6). This motion was based on the affidavit
of counsel for the appellant (R 13, 14) wherein it was
recited that he first received knowledge on April 3, 1964,
that the order of dismissal of this action had been entered on February 21, 1964. However, it is clear from
the record (R 20, 21, 22) that counsel had abandoned the
complaint in this action following its dismissal, and on
February 28, 1964, refiled the identical clain1ed action.
Surely counsel did not intend that two identical actions
be pending at the same time. Further, at the hearing of
the Motion to Extend Time in which to file this appeal,
Mr. Frandsen, appellant's counsel, testified as follows
(R 17, L 29 to R 18, L 12):

Q : And in the case, second case, you resisted the
motion to dismiss April 3; is that correctf
A: That's correct.

Q: Now, did you intend, if that motion to dismiss
had been denied by the court, did you in that
event, intend to appeal the first casef
A: I always wanted to appeal the first cause
of action, but my client didn't think that was
the wisest path to follow, and so I didn't
have - I hadn't made up my mind one way
or the other.

Q: Did your plans (Client prefer) to refile a
complaint to appealing1
A: Yes. He favored filing a new complaint rather
than appealing.
Mr Hobbs; That's all.
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Tht- rPspondents ~ulnnit that it is clear fro1n the
rPCOl'(l that following the disn1issal of this action, the
appellant and his counsel discussed the matter, that the
alt\'rnatives of appealing this action or refiling a new
<"omplaint were discussed between them, and that the
<'lit'Bt, the appellant herein, "favored filing a new
complaint rather than appealing." (R 18, L 10, 11).
Only after counsel for the appellant realized that the
seeond dismissal, based on res judicata by the dismissal of this instant action, from which no appeal had
ht>Pn tht>n taken, was proper, did counsel seek the only
avPnne of escape, the affidavit (R 13) reciting that he
did not reeeive the order of dismissal of this action.
The question occurs, if counsel did not know of the
di~mi~sal of the first complaint, what was the purpose
of filing the second~ Notwithstanding the lack of knowl(~c1g·( '. the testimony of counsel is clear that the alternative
of filing a new complaint versus appealing the dismissal
of this aetion were discussed, and that the appellant
pn.>vailed on his counsel to seek the course of refiling.
CPrtainly the conversation between appellant and his
eounsel, as related by counsel for the appellant (R 18, L 2
to 1~) presupposes knowledge in both the appellant and
his counsel that this cause had been dismissed, and that
t lw 1wxt step in this action, if they elected to pursue it
rather than refiling, was an appeal. Mr. Frandsen stated
(R 18, L 5 "I alzrays wanted to appeal the first cause of
aetion, but 1ny client didn't think that was the wisest
path to follow .... " (Italics added.) In other words, counsel preferred to appeal the dismissal of this action, but
hi~ client preferred to refile a new cmnplaint. This was
necp~~arily prior to February 28, the date the second
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action was filed. One n1onth and ten days following this
date, one month and seventeen days following the date
of the entering of the order of dismissal (R 5), and after
the second action had been dismissed as res judicata,
conusel belatedly advised the court that he had always
intended to appeal this action, but that he was not aware
that it had been dismissed. See Anderson vs. Anderson,
3 Utah 2nd 277, 282 Pac. 2nd 845, and cases therein
cited. See also Holton vs. Holton, 243 Pac 2nd 438,
wherein the court stated:
"Although the new rules of civil procedure
were intended to provide liberality in procedure,
it is nevertheless expected that they will be followed, and unless reasons satisfactory to the
courts are advanced as a basis for relief from
complying with them, parties will not be excused
from so doing."
It is submitted that the record in this case clearly
discloses that the failure of appellant to file a timely
appeal in this action was in no way based upon any
failure to learn of the entry of judgment, but was based
on counsel's decision to follow the advice of his client,
notwithstanding that he preferred to do otherwise, and to
attempt to commence the identical action a second time,
rather than file a timely appeal.
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CONCLUSIO~

1t is rP~pectfully submitted that the ruling of Judge
VanCott in this action was proper, and should be affirmed, and ·in the alternative that the appeal was not
taken within t hP time and in the manner required by the
nppli<'ahlP rules of proecdure and case law, that the
order of Judge Aldon Anderson extending the time for
appeal Rhould hP reversed, and that the appeal should
hP

<lismi~SP<l

LEE W. HOBBS
Salt Lake City, Utah
1119 Continental Bank Building
Attorney for Respondents
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